Rest in Peace--Or Thy Will Be Done by Rippner, Ellis V.
REST IN PEACE-OR THY WILL BE DONE
ELLIS V. RIPPNER*
The author's vast experience permits him to skillfully reveal the
legal and practical nuances of will contest actions. He identifies the
numerous problems confronted in Ohio in a will contest action and
sets forth proposals on how these difficulties can be avoided or mini-
mized.
The aim of this article is to make the reader aware of the obstacles
which confront him in the filing of a will contest action, as well as
how to by-pass these obstacles by effectuating a settlement through
proper preparation and investigative techniques. Toward this end, the
following points are considered: (1) the type of interest necessary to
qualify in Ohio as a plaintiff in a will contest case; (2) the evaluation
of the contestant's case through the use of discovery techniques; (3)
the use of information obtained in discovery in conjunction with
obtaining an "agreement not to contest;" and (4) the procedural and
technical pitfalls which abound under Ohio law in the institution of a
will contest case, with particular emphasis being placed upon the proper
joinder of all parties.
I. CAN YOUR CLIENT FILE A CONTEST?
A. Statutory Provisions
The first inquiry one must make in determining whether to handle
a possible will contest case is whether his prospective client has the
statutory qualifications to be plaintiff. The right to contest a will is
conferred only on a person interested in a will or codicil admitted to
probate.' It follows that where a plaintiff is not an interested person
within the context of Ohio Revised Code section 2741.01, any judg-
ment setting aside the will is void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction.2
B. Requirement of Direct Pecuniary Interest in Decedent's Estate
1. General Application of Rule
In Bloor v. Platt,3 the Ohio Supreme Court defined an interested
person as follows:
Any person who has such a direct, immediate and legally ascertained
pecuniary interest in the devolution of the testator's estate as would
* Mr. Rippner is a member of the law firm Rippner, Schwartz, Carlin & Weiss,
Cleveland, Ohio.
1 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.01 (Page 1953).
2 Donovan v. Decker, 98 Ohio App. 183, 122 N.E.2d 501 (1953).
3 78 Ohio St. 46, 84 N.E. 604 (1908).
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be impaired or defeated by the probate of the will, or be benefited
by setting aside the will, is 'a person interested.' 4
Patently, an interested person includes a next-of-kin who would
inherit under the law of intestate succession if the probated will were
declared invalid,5 as well as a beneficiary under a prior unprobated
will.6
Less obvious are the rights of the guardian of a mentally incom-
petent person, a judgment-creditor of an heir, the successors in interest
of a decedent's estate, and the State of Ohio.
In In re Kowalke,7 it was held that it is the duty of the guardian
of a mental incompetent to determine whether reasonable grounds exist
for contest of any will under which the ward receives substantially
less than he or she would receive as an heir-at-law, and, upon making
such determination, to institute and maintain a will contest on behalf
of his ward.8
In Bloor v. Platt,9 the decedent devised her estate in trust for
the benefit of her only heir, a spendthrift son. The purpose of the
trust was to defeat the rights of the son's judgment creditors. Shortly
after the decedent's death, one of these judgment creditors levied on
lands owned by the decedent and then proceeded to file an action
to contest the decedent's will. Upon demurrer by the son, the supreme
court held that the lienholder was an interested person, because his
interests would prevail in the event the will was set aside.10
Since the right to contest a will is a property right, and not a mere
personal privilege, this right survives the death of the testator's child
and passes to the child's personal representative or heirs-at-law.11
Can the prosecuting attorney, on behalf of the state, file a will
4 Id. at 49-50, 84 N.E. at 605.
5 Adams v. Gurklies, 88 Ohio App. 225, 91 N.E.2d 706 (1949); Wilson v. Wilson,
8 Ohio App. 258 (1917).
0G Kennedy v. Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E. 336 (1928). However, a beneficiary
under the probated will has no right to contest unless he has some other legal interest in
the estate. Leedy v. Cockley, 14 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 72, 22 Ohio C. Dec. 299 (Cir. Ct.
1911).
7 8o Ohio App. 515, 76 N.E.2d 899 (1946).
8 Statutory authority for the prosecution of such action is found in Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2111.14 (Page 1953).
9 78 Ohio St. 46, 84 N.E. 604 (1908). Accord, Herbster v. Pincombe, 10 Ohio
App. 322 (1918) (judgment-creditor of decedent's son was plaintiff).
10 The Bloor case was decided prior to the enactment of Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2105.06 (Page 1953), whereby a competent adult can renounce an intestate succession.
Under this statute, it appears that a debtor, by renouncing his interests under the law of
intestacy, could defeat the right of a lien creditor to contest a will under which the debtor
was a beneficiary.
11 Chilcoto v. .'offman, 97 Ohio St. 98, 119 N.E. 364 (1918).
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contest action where the decedent left no next-of-kin in order to
promote an escheat to the state? In the only reported Ohio case dealing
with this question, a common pleas court answered in the negative."2
The court reasoned that the statute of descent and distribution does
not place the State of Ohio within the category of an heir; hence, the
state could not be a "person interested" within the meaning of Ohio
Revised Code section 2741.01 (G.C. section 12079) and has no right
to file a will contest action.
2. Estoppel to Contest; the Doctrine of Election
If your prospective client is a legatee or devisee under the will
which is the subject of contest, inquiry must always be made as to
whether he has accepted any benefit given to him by the will. Clearly,
an interested party may lose his right to contest a will by electing to
receive benefits given him under the will.' 3 "It is the moral, economic
rule, and the rule of written law that one cannot both eat his cake and
have it." 4
(a) Bequests of Personalty
As to bequests of personal property, courts have taken ap-
parently conflicting positions with regard to whether, in the absence
of fraud, a tender back of the bequest can be made so as to revoke the
election. This conflict is explained when the cases are analyzed in view
of whether or not the will contained an in terrorem clause. In
Spangler v. Beare,5 the plaintiff had accepted a legacy of four thousand
dollars, which acceptance was set up in the answer as a special defense.
The plaintiff then tendered the funds back to the executor, and also
replied that receipt of the legacy had been procured by fraud. The
court held that even if the acceptance had not been procured by fraud,
the acceptance of the legacy could be revoked and the money returned
so as to reinstitute the right of plaintiff to sue. Four years later, the
supreme court in Kelley v. Hazzard,6 held that tender back of a legacy
is not a condition precedent to bringing an action to contest a will if
the tender back is made before trial. By way of dictum, the court
in Kelley suggested that a tender back is unnecessary if the party
chargeable with the tender would, upon prevailing in the will contest,
receive at least as much as he then had in his possession.
12 State ex rel. Rich v. Page, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 647, 20 Ohio Op. 155 (C.P. 1941).
13 Patterson v. Atkinson, 7 Ohio App. 495 (1917).
14 Bender v. Bateman, 33 Ohio App. 66, 70, 168 N.E. 574, 575 (1929).
15 2 Ohio App. 133 (1913).
16 96 Ohio St. 19, 117 N.E. 182 (1917). Surprisingly, the Spangler case was not dis-
cussed by the supreme court in Kelley v. Hazzard.
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If the will contains a provision to the effect that anyone who
should contest the will loses his legacy, the doctrine of estoppel by
acceptance is more firmly applied. It appears clear that in such a case,
the tender back, if allowed at all in the absence of fraud, must be
made before suit is instituted." In both the Kelley and Spangler cases,
the will did not contain an in terrorem clause.
(b) Devise of Real Property
Where there is an acceptance of a devise of real property, no
tender back is possible unless there is a positive allegation of fraud
or misrepresentation. This rule appears to apply regardless of whether
the will contains a forfeiture clause. 8
3. Lack of Direct Pecuniary Interest
In many situations, the prospective client will have an interest in
the decedent's estate, but this interest will not be legally sufficient to
enable the client to maintain a will contest action.
(a) Executor Under Prior Will
For example, a person named executor under a prior unprobated
will does not have the requisite pecuniary interest to contest a will
executed later in time. An executor's right to a fee is a right to payment
for services rendered, which is clearly distinct from a pecuniary
interest in the devolution of the decedent's estate. 9
(b) Illegitimate Children
The Ohio Supreme Court has decided two rather unique cases
dealing with the rights of illegitimate children to contest wills. In
Blackwell v. Bowman,2" A had designated B, his illegitimate son, as
his heir-at-law.2 1 A passed away. Subsequently, C, the brother of A,
also passed away. It was held that B, the designated heir, had no right
to contest the will of C because as a designated heir, he stood as a child
17 Bender v. Bateman, 33 Ohio App. 66, 168 N.E. 574 (1929); Zinn v. Ferris, 27
Ohio Dec. 27 (C.P. 1910), aff'd 88 Ohio St. 555, 106 N.E. 1087 (1913). In the Bender
case the court intimated that if the will contained a forfeiture clause, no tender back
could be made in the absence of fraud. However, no offer was made to return the be-
quest, so that this statement was clearly dictum.
18 Spangler v. Beare, 2 Ohio App. 133 (1913); Leedy v. Cocldey, 14 Ohio C.C.R.
(n.s.) 72, 22 Ohio C. Dec. 299 (Cir. Ct. 1911).
19 Hermann v. Crossen, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 322, 160 N.E.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1959).
20 150 Ohio St. 34, 80 N.E.2d 493 (1948).
21 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2105.15 (Page 1953) as to the procedure for the
designation of an heir.
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only to A, the declarant, and was no relation to the declarant's family 22
If the right of plaintiff to maintain a will contest action is placed in
issue by defendant, the court without a jury should try this question.
Hence, in Comer v. Comer,' it was held that the trial court properly
dismissed a will contest action brought by the illegitimate son of the
decedent where the evidence on the preliminary hearing showed that
although the decedent had married the child's mother and acknowl-
edged the child as his own, he was not, in fact, the father of the
plaintiff.
(c) Surviving Spouse
In a case of first impression in Ohio, the decedent had three
children and his surviving spouse filed a will contest action. It was
held that:
[A] surviving spouse should not be permitted to resort to the costly
and time consuming action to contest a will when the same result
can be accomplished by the simple method of electing not to take
under the will of the decedent.24
Since the wife was contesting as an heir-at-law, she would receive
one-third of the estate if the will was set aside. Obviously, the same
result would be accomplished by electing against the will pursuant
to Ohio Revised Code section 2107.39.
II. DISCOVRING THE MERITS OF YOUR POSITION
A. Avoidance of a Directed Verdict as a Standard for Evaluation
Having first established that the prospective contestant has the
legal right to file a will contest action, the attorney must next ascertain
whether or not the case has substantial merit. In essence, the attorney
should be intellectually and legally satisfied that he is not filing a
"nuisance case." The standard to be applied in making this evaluation
is whether sufficient evidence can be produced to avoid a directed
verdict. The statute specifically provides that "the order of probate
is prima-facie evidence of the attestation, execution and validity of
the will or codicil."25 Hence, the trial court is required to direct a
verdict sustaining the will when the evidence introduced by the con-
22 Clearly, since the designation of an heir-at-law is a unilateral action, the declarant
could not contest the will of his designee.
23 175 Ohio St. 313, 194 N.E.2d 572 (1963).
24 Klicke v. Uhlenbrock, 94 Ohio L. Abs. 402, 406, 200 N.E.2d 497, 499-500 (C.P.
1964).
25 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.05 (Page 1953).
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testant does not overcome the prima facie case established upon
probate of the will.28
In order to evaluate the case in terms of a directed verdict
standard, the attorney must put himself in the position of a judge.
He cannot harbor the same emotional bias as his prospective client.
For example, the clients will approach their attorney and say that
their father must have been a raving lunatic when he made his will.
"Why do you say this?" counsel will ask. The invariable reply is
simple. "Because he left his entire estate to our stepmother," they say.
Children feel that they cannot be excluded from their parents' wills.
Morally they may be correct, but legally they are not. Of course, in
such a situation the case will never get to the jury.
The principle can be best demonstrated by a case in which the
referring attorney told me that a man had left his entire estate of
1,600,000 dollars to his second wife. The gentleman had three children.
The will was executed about three months before he died. The man was
then sixty-five years of age and had been married two years. Strangely
enough, his second wife was a woman twenty-three years of age, and it
was said that the decedent had died as a result of a heart attack while
doing the "twist." This will looked as though it would be readily subject
to a contest. But the decision of whether to contest the will was
deferred until after conferring with the decedent's three children.
Upon meeting these ladies, my first impression was that their demeanor,
conduct and general bearing would make them ideal plaintiffs in a will
contest case-provided that the case was strong enough to get to a jury.
They were asked to describe their father, so as to permit ascertainment
of whether the father had testamentary capacity under the rule of
Niemes v. Niemes.2 7
From their description it was learned that their father had been
a C.P.A. for some forty years, and had inherited the major portion
of his estate from his first wife, the prospective clients' mother. He had
remained single for about a year and a half after her death. The dece-
dent knew his children and visited them frequently. Thus their father
recognized "the natural heirs of his bounty."
In regard to whether or not he knew the extent of his estate, one
daughter then volunteered that he knew not only the extent of his own
estate, but that he knew the extent of each one of their estates. Their
father had prepared each of their income tax returns up to the time
of his death. Of course, knowing this, there was no need to raise the
question as to whether he was aware of their claim upon his bounty.
26 Andes v. Shippe, 165 Ohio St. 275, 135 N.E.2d 396 (1956).
27 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503 (1917).
[Vol. 28
REST IN PEACE
Turning to the subject of undue influence, the ladies were asked
whether their father was dominated by their stepmother. The reply
was as follows:
My father was the type of person who if he didn't want to do some-
thing he would put his heels in the rug and no one could move him,
neither my mother, any of us girls, the grandchildren, nor the
stepmother. Dad had his own way and was a controller of his own
destiny.
From all that was revealed in the conversation with the decedent's
daughters, clearly there was no possibility of a successful contest.
At the other end of the spectrum, if a probate court had appointed
a guardian of the decedent's estate because the decedent was under
mental disability, and during the pendency of the guardianship the
decedent had executed a will, the court could not direct a verdict for the
defendant. The adjudication of insanity creates a rebuttable presump-
tion of continued incompetence, 8 which not only overcomes the pre-
sumption of due execution and validity which arises from the order
probating the will, 9 but also shifts the burden of going forward with
the evidence to the defendants.30
B. Tools of the Attorney in Evaluating His Position
Realistically, most cases are not this simple to analyze or evaluate
in terms of the directed verdict standard. Proof of lack of testa-
mentary capacity is generally based on cumulative evidence of various
disabilities. Two important methods of discovery in order to determine
the merits of a case are the taking of long form testimony of the
witnesses,"l and the use of an independent investigator.
1. Long Form Testimony of the Witnesses
Upon the filing of an application to probate a will, notice must be
given to the
surviving spouse and to the persons known to the applicant to be
residents of the state who would be entitled to inherit from the testa-
tor under sections 2105.01 to 2105.21, inclusive, of the Revised
Code, if he had died intestate.32
28 Kennedy v. Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E. 336 (1928); Potts v. First
Central Trust Co., 37 Ohio L. Abs. 382, 47 N.E.2d 823 (Ct. App. 1940).
29 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.05 (Page 1953).
30 Kennedy v. Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442, 161 N.E. 336 (1928). It should be pointed
out that the appointment of a guardian of the person does not alone raise a presumption
of incompetency. Roderick v. Fisher, 97 Ohio App. 95, 122 N.E.2d 475 (1954).
31 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.14 (Page 1953).
32 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.13 (Page 1953).
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If your client is one of these persons to whom notice must be given,
or is otherwise an interested person, he has the absolute right to com-
pel the attendance of any witness to the will for purposes of cross-
examination.33
For several reasons, the importance of this right cannot be over-
emphasized. The attorney for the prospective contestants might be
satisfied after cross-examining the attesting witnesses that he could
not produce sufficient evidence to prove lack of testamentary capacity.
By way of example, if the witnesses are persons well known in the
community and of unimpeachable integrity, the attorney would know
that they would never witness a document where there was a possibility
that the testator was not of sound mind and memory or was under re-
straint. Similarly, if the witnesses are the testator's physician, attorney
or clergyman, the possibility of a successful will contest is indeed re-
mote.
Since the taking of long form testimony is a discovery procedure,
the attorney should cross-examine the witnesses with a view toward
finding out exactly what happened when the will was executed. In most
cases the recitations in the attestation clause of the will serve to guide
and support the witness. He will testify in accordance with the attesta-
tion clause. Therefore, it generally serves no useful purpose to ask the
witness whether he was in the presence of the other witness and the
testator when the will was executed. Instead, inquiry should be made
regarding all of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
will which are not set forth in the attestation clause.
In this respect, the attorney for the prospective contestant should
ask for a separation of the witnesses he is going to cross-examine. In
many situations the witnesses will force their memories with the
result that the testimony is conflicting and ambiguous.
In one situation, one of the witnesses confused the time when
she had witnessed a deed for the decedent with the time she had
attested the decedent's signature to the will. Her testimony was entirely
at variance with that of the other witnesses and a settlement was
immediately negotiated.
An often overlooked aspect of long form testimony is that the
contestant may have no other opportunity to cross-examine the witness
to the will. The proponent is not required to call the witnesses for
direct examination at trial.
On the other hand, the attorney for the prospective contestant
must not look upon cross-examination of the witnesses as a procedure
to be used in every situation. The value of cross-examination must be
33 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.14 (Page 1953).
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weighed carefully. To illustrate, recently the attorney for the proponent
had the two witnesses to the will give their testimony in short form
(merely a statement to the deputy in probate court). Prior to the
probate of the will, the contestants, who were next-of-kin, demanded
the testimony in long form. For the first time, the attorneys for the
proponent discovered that the two witnesses were in their eighties, that
they were both keen and alert, and because they had not often acted
as witnesses, the execution of the will was such a memorable occasion
that they remembered every detail. These two witnesses had been
neighbors of the decedent for thirty-five years, and gave such impor-
tant, vital and personal testimony that in a trial it would have been
difficult for a jury to deny that the testator had testamentary capacity.
They proved such excellent witnesses that they discouraged an other-
wise possibly successful contest. Their testimony was reduced to
writing and filed in the records of the court, and could have been used
at trial in the event the witnesses were deceased or under mental
disability. Short form testimony would not have had such a precluding
effect as to the testamentary capacity of the testator and the due
execution of the will, because it merely would have recited that the
testator was of legal age, sound mind and memory and not under
restraint. Without the long form testimony, it might well have been
difficult for the proponent to succeed in sustaining the will, because the
testator, in a will prepared three months before his death, had disin-
herited collateral heirs in favor of close friends. Medical testimony
could have been secured by the contestants which might have permitted
the case to be submitted to the jury. As the result of long form
testimony, the contestants really had done a service for the proponents
of the will.
2. The Independent Investigator
In conjunction with the discovery procedure under Ohio Revised
Code section 2107.14, the attorney for the prospective contestant
should begin immediately to compile and evaluate evidence relative
to the proposed action. Promptness in such investigation is mandatory.
In many cases, as previously illustrated, the facts are in truth other
than those related to the attorney by an over-eager client.
In one case, the attorneys had positive evidence that a will was
executed five days before the testator died. The prospective contestants
maintained-and truthfully so-that the decedent had been an alco-
holic for twenty-two years prior to his death. They had the names of
the various sanatariums and workhouses to which he had been com-
mitted or confined. In fact, the contestants' attorney knew from his
1967]
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own personal knowledge that the decedent was referred to as the "town
drunk," and the attorney almost determined to file the contest
without any investigation. The preliminary investigation disclosed
that the testator, eight weeks before drafting his will, had become a
member of Alcoholics Anonymous and had been actively engaged in
its work. It revealed that he had attended numerous meetings of the
organization, at which he had given testimonials; that he had
completely abstained from intoxicants; and that he had discussed his
problem and his reformation with many people of unimpeachable
integrity who would make excellent witnesses against the contestants.
Moreover, they had all given statements verifying the testator's sound-
ness of mind and memory and his desire that the named beneficiary
be the recipient of his sizeable estate. In fact, the doctor who signed
the death certificate and who had been a physician for many years,
suggested that a sudden withdrawal from the use of alcohol might well
have been the actual cause of the testator's death. Suffice to say, there
were no proper grounds for a contest, and the attorney was able to
avoid the embarrassment of filing a nuisance action.
The investigation should be conducted by an independent investi-
gator, not by the attorney himself. First, the attorney's time is his
stock in trade, and it is generally too valuable to be used for investi-
gative purposes. Second, the witness may at some future date contradict
the statement she made by saying that the attorney "put words in her
mouth." Third, and most important, the attorney does not investigate
objectively. He looks at the situation with a view toward finding out
only that which will help him in an effort to build up his case.
Advocates who continually serve in investigative capacities,
either by choice or as a delegated responsibility, are often easy
prey for a common malady known as 'the county attorney's
syndrome.' Faced with persistent pressure for results from their
work, they are forced to develop cases by induction rather
than by deduction. They reason from a conclusion toward a logical
basis for it, rather than developing the conclusion from facts
adduced during the investigation.34
Ideally, the attorney should not disclose to the investigator the
position he is taking in the matter at hand. The attorney cannot
evaluate his position unless he has impartial accurate information.
The attorney must direct the investigator to elicit information relative
to the legal tests for insanity or undue influence as the case may be.
The milkman may be the person who knows that the testator could
31 Meier, "The Advocate as Investigator," 50 A.B.AJ. 835-36 (1964).
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not remember the names of his children or that the testator did not
know the nature or extent of his property.
Proper investigative techniques suggest the reduction of the
witnesses' oral statement to writing, with each page being initialed
and dated by the witness. As a precaution, a statement should contain
a declaration that the witness signed it of his own free will, without
threat, coercion, or offer of reward on the part of the investigator.
Even though the statements cannot be introduced into evidence
to prove the truth of the facts contained therein, they do serve a two-
fold purpose. First, the attorney can evaluate his case for trial pur-
poses; second, accurate statements are invaluable in effectuating a
settlement.
III. ATTEMPT SETTLEMENT BEFORE FILING A LAWSUIT
A. Use of Charts
Convinced of the merits of his case and possessed of the infor-
mation obtained through the discovery devices of the long form
testimony of the witnesses and proper investigation, the attorney is
ready to prepare a chart as the final tool in reaching a settlement. The
chart in a will contest case is a visual aid device, designed to give his
opponent an idea of the strength of his position without revealing
directly the sources of his information. In essence, the statements of
the witnesses are categorized and compiled under headings such as
"impairment of memory," "lack of knowledge of next-of-kin," and
the like. The chart will indicate the frequency of acquaintance of the
decedent with his witness, but it will not reveal the witness' name.
Armed with such a chart, the attorney is ready to face opposing
counsel to the end that a settlement can be reached which is fair to all
concerned and which will avoid costly and time consuming litigation.
B. Technique in Negotiating a Settlement
If a will is set aside by the jury, the work of the attorney for the
contestant will inure to the benefit of all interested persons, whether
or not represented by counsel' 5 Hence, in many situations, several
of the heirs-at-law will attempt to secure the benefits of litigation
without any burden to them. The answer to the problem caused by
35 Powell v. Koehler, 52 Ohio St. 103, 39 N.E. 195 (1894). See also Hull v. Roseman,
95 Ohio L. Abs. 218, 198 N.E.2d 792 (C.P. 1964), where a settlement was made during
an appeal of the decision of the common pleas court in a will contest case. It was held
that only those persons who were parties to the settlement were entitled to share in the
proceeds of the settlement.
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such persons is an agreement not to contest 8 entered into by one or
more prospective contestants, the executor37 and the beneficiaries under
the probated will. Under this arrangement, the attorney for the executor
and the beneficiaries will not have to negotiate with numerous parties,
and the possibilities of protracted litigation38 are greatly diminished.
The agreement should contain the following: (1) a statement
that a contest is threatened, since the consideration for the contract
is the avoidance of the action; (2) the sum of money or other benefits
to be paid; (3) the specific date of performance of the contract after
the expiration of the six month period for contest provided in sections
2107.23 and 2741.09 of the Ohio Revised Code; and (4) a provision
that in the event a will contest is filed by persons not parties to the
agreement, then the performance of the agreement is to commence after
the expiration of the time for final appeal of a verdict sustaining the
will. Hence, under an agreement not to contest, the prospective plain-
tiffs are protected even if other parties sue to set aside the will.
Aside from avoiding unfavorable publicity and embarrassment,
the settlement of a will contest before suit saves the contestant the
costs of paying the fiduciary and his attorney for their services in the
defense of the action, even though the will is set aside."9 In a relatively
small estate, the fees allowed may be disproportionately large, with the
result the contestants will have defeated their own purpose.
IV. PROCEDURAL PITFALLS IN THE INITIATION OF A
WILL CONTEST ACTION
After having explored all avenues of settlement without success,
the attorney must be prepared to initiate an action to set aside the will
36 By the weight of authority, a bona fide agreement to refrain from contesting a
will by parties interested is valid. West v. Leslie, 21 Ohio Op. 89 (P. Ct. 1941).
87 It has been held in Ohio that an executor is not a necessary party to such an
agreement where no special circumstances or trusts affect him and his interest is ex officio
only. Skelly v. Graybill, 109 Ohio App. 277, 165 N.E.2d 218 (1959). However, the execu-
tor is often a devisee or legatee or is interested in settling on behalf of the devisees or
legatees, and therefore should be included in the agreement as he will make distribution
from estate assets in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
38 Once an action to contest a will is filed, it cannot be dismissed without a jury
verdict unless all parties to the action or their counsel approve an entry of dismissal.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.04 (Page 1953). See Central Nat'l Bank v. Eells, 5 Ohio
Misc. 187, 215 N.E.2d 77 (P. Ct. 1965). However, it is difficult to obtain the approval of
all parties or their counsel to the dismissal of an action unless they receive some benefit,
pecuniary or otherwise. Usually the dissenters are those parties who are not represented
by independent counsel, but who are benefiting from free services of plaintiff's attorney.
$9 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.04 (Page 1953) provides that the trial court shall
allow to the fiduciary and his attorney, as part of the costs of administration, reasonable
compensation for services rendered. This provision was held constitutional in Lindsey v.
Markley, 87 Ohio App. 529, 96 N.E.2d 311 (1950).
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in question. Probably no other type of lawsuit is fraught with as many
procedural traps. Mistakes and defects which might be cured in other
actions are fatal to the will contest.
A. Nature of Action to Contest Will
Even though the right to contest a will has always existed in
Ohio,4" the proceedings to contest are now purely statutory.41 The
provisions relating to an action for the contest of a will or codicil are
mandatory,42 and the enjoyment of the right to maintain such an action
is entirely dependent upon compliance with all statutory conditions
and limitations.' Any failure to comply with the statutes extinguishes
the right to contest.
B. Mandatory Jurisdictional Requirements
1. Timely Initiation of Action
One of the statutory jurisdictional conditions in a will contest
action is that the right to contest must be exercised within the period
prescribed by the statute.4 It is provided that:
An action to contest a will or codicil shall be brought within six
months after it has been admitted to probate, but persons under any
legal disability may bring such action within six months after
such disability is removed.40
The action may be brought only "in the Court of Common Pleas of the
county in which such probate was had."4 The statutes limiting the
period within which a will contest case may be initiated are not mere
remedial statutes of limitations, but rather impose a condition on the
right to contest.47 Hence, six months after a will is admitted to probate,
the right to contest is extinguished by lapse of time and the court loses
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. This jurisdictional
defect is properly attacked by a motion to dismiss." As an exception
40 Mosier v. Harmon, 29 Ohio St. 220 (1876).
41 Andes v. Shippe, 165 Ohio St. 275, 135 NZE.2d 396 (1956). The statutes regarding
will contests are Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2107.23 and 2741.01 (Page 1953). For a
discussion of the history of a proceeding to contest a will in Ohio see Slemmons v.
Toland, 5 Ohio App. 201 (1916).
42 Case v. Smith, 142 Ohio St. 95, 50 N.E.2d 142 (1943).
43 Gravier v. Gluth, 99 Ohio App. 374, 119 NYE.2d 663 (1954), aff'd 163 Ohio St. 232,
126 N.E.2d 332 (1955).
44 Donovan v. Decker, 98 Ohio App. 183, 122 N.E.2d 501 (1953). The jurisdictional
requirement relating to capacity to sue has previously been considered. See text accom-
panying notes 1-23 supra.
40 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2741.09, 2107.23 (Page 1953).
46 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.01 (Page 1953).
47 Woodruff v. Norvill, 91 Ohio App. 251, 107 N.E.2d 911 (1951).
48 Christensen v. Maxen, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 219 (Ct. App. 1938).
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to the limitation period, it is provided by statute49 that a person under
legal disability may bring a will contest action within six months after
removal of the disability.50 In Powell v. Koehler51 the supreme court
held that this savings clause inures to the benefit of all those interested
in the estate; for the will, being an entirety, is wholly inoperative when
set aside at the suit of any party.
2. Joinder of Necessary Parties
(a) Statutory Provisions
Another mandatory jurisdictional requirement in a will contest
action is that all necessary parties must be named in the petition and
joined either as plaintiff or defendant prior to the expiration of the
period of time set forth in the statute of limitations.52 In this regard,
necessary parties are defined as "All the devisees, legatees, and heirs
of the testator, and other interested persons, including the executor
or administrator."53 Much of the litigation concerning the failure to
join necessary parties deals with application of the terms "heirs" and
"other interested persons," as well as with problems concerning the
executor or administrator.54
(b) "Heirs"
Within the meaning of Ohio Revised Code section 2741.02, the
term "heirs" is a generic term embracing not everyone who is named in
the statutes of descent and distribution, but only those who take in
the situation existing at the death of the testator.55
Perhaps the most subtle pitfall in the application of the term
"heirs" comes to the fore where there is a possibility of a "half-and-
half"'56 implication should the decedent die intestate. In Kluever v.
49 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2741.09, 2107.23 (Page 1953).
50 Legal disability is defined as including persons of unsound mind, persons in cap-
tivity and persons under guardianship of the person or estate. See Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2131.02 (Page 1953).
51 52 Ohio St. 103, 39 N.E. 195 (1894).
52 Kluever v. Cleveland Trust Co., 173 Ohio St. 177, 180 N.E.2d 579 (1962). See
Note, 19 Ohio St. LJ. 772 (1958).
53 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2741.02 (Page 1953).
54 The categories of legatees and devisees generally do not present difficult prob-
lems, as the identification of individuals in these capacities can be ascertained from the
will. But see Leedy v. Cockley, 14 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 72, 22 Ohio C. Dec. 299 (Cir. Ct.
1911), in which the court held that a remainderman is a devisee and, therefore, a neces-
sary party defendant. See also Kellough v. Moses, 32 Ohio App. 49 (1920) (contingent
remainderman is merely a proper party).
55 Bussell v. Cline, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 481, 161 N.E.2d 655 (C.P. 1959).
56 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2105.10 (Page 1953).
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The Cleveland Trust Co.,57 it was discovered during the course of
the trial that a son of the deceased former spouse of the testatrix, who
died without issue, would under the half-and-half statute inherit part
of the decedent's estate if it were determined that the decedent had
died intestate. It was further discovered that the plaintiff knew this
stepson quite well. The stepson had not been made a party to the
lawsuit. At that point a motion to dismiss was sustained by the trial
court. In affirming the judgment below, the supreme court pointed
out that it made no difference if the testatrix had executed prior wills,
because under Ohio law one who inherits by reason of the half-and-
half statute is an heir of the testator, and as such, must be made a party
defendant in an action to contest the will.
The requirements of the statute have been construed to preclude
an heir-at-law, not named in the petition, from filing an entry of ap-
pearance in an attempt to vitalize a defective petition.5
As a matter of practice, if accurate definite information cannot
be obtained as to the decedent's heirs, it is advisable to follow the
statutory procedure for naming as defendants and securing publica-
tion service upon the decedent's unknown heirs, devisees and legatees5 9
(c) "Other Interested Persons"
In determining whether a specific party is an "other interested
person" and thus a necessary defendant in a will contest action, the
courts have taken the position that there is no distinction between
the character of interest necessary to support the right to contest and
the character of interest held by one required to be made a party
defendant in a will contest.6 0 In either case, there must be a direct
pecuniary interest in the will at the time of the testator's death.6 1
It has previously been suggested that a beneficiary under a prior
5 173 Ohio St. 177, 180 N.E.2d 579 (1962).
58 Williams v. Wilfong, 114 Ohio App. 183, 181 N.E.2d 314 (1961). In McKinney
v. McKinney, 115 Ohio App. 379, 185 N.E.2d 319 (1960), several of decedent's heirs-at-law
were joined as plaintiff without their consent. A motion to dismiss these parties as plain-
tiff was granted. Although the court did point out that these heirs could have been joined
as defendants, there was no decision by the court as to whether the requirements of
Ohio Revised Code Ann. § 2741.02 were met in view of such dismissal. See Frederick v.
Brown, 102 Ohio App. 117, 141 NXE.2d 683 (1956), in which it was stated as dictum that
a non-consenting plaintiff cannot withdraw from the action.
GO This procedure is set forth in Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2703.24 (Page 1953). The
practice of joining "unknown heirs" as parties defendant was referred to by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Fletcher v. First Nat'l Bank, 167 Ohio St. 211, 147 N.E.2d 621 (1958).
60 Durbin v. Durbin, 106 Ohio App. 155, 153 N.E.2d 706 (1957).
61 Id. See Chilcote v. Hoffman, 97 Ohio St. 93, 119 N.E. 364 (1918).
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unprobated will has sufficient interest to contest a later will.2 Not-
withstanding this fact, the beneficiaries under such prior wills as the
testator may have executed are not necessary parties defendant even
though they appear to have the requisite "pecuniary interest." In
reaching this conclusion, the supreme court stressed the insurmountable
difficulties in discovering this type of information.63 More logical in
view of the pecuniary interest required for a defendant is the rule that
an executor named in a former will whose appointment has been
revoked by codicil is not an "interested person" in an action to contest
the will and codicil.64 Such person cannot contest the codicil, 5 and,
therefore, should not be deemed to be a necessary party defendant.
In Durbin v. Durbin,66 the testator made a bequest of bank stock,
subject to the direction that "none of said stock shall be sold by any of
said legatees unless with the consent and approval of" the president of
the bank. In addition to holding that the bank president was not
an "interested person" because the will contest could not directly affect
him, the court intimated that the interest of the bank president, if any,
was void as a restraint on alienation.
As to persons who have sufficient interest to be deemed necessary
parties, it has been suggested as dictum that a judgment creditor of an
heir and the grantee of a devisee under the will might be parties
necessary to the contest of a will."r
The application of the "pecuniary interest" rule to cases in which
the will being contested makes provision for a testamentary trust has
led to constant litigation.
It appears very clear that a trustee of a testamentary trust
provided for in the contested will is a necessary party defendant,
whether or not such trustee has affirmatively accepted his trust. In
Martin v. Falconer,8 the will and codicil of the decedent were set
aside. In that action, the trustees named under the decedent's will
were joined as parties defendant; however, the trustees had never
62 See discussion supra note 6.
03 Machovina v. Machovina, 132 Ohio St. 171, 5 N.E.2d 496 (1936).
64 Bruckmann v. Shaffer, 108 Ohio App. 531, 155 N.E.2d 491 (1958).
65 See Hermann v. Crossen, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 322, 160 N.E.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1959).
66 106 Ohio App. 155, 153 N.E.2d 706 (1957).
67 McCord v. McCord, 104 Ohio St. 274, 135 N.E. 548 (1922). In Sears v. Stinehelfer,
89 Ohio St. 163, 105 N.E. 1047 (1913), the court held that a devisee of a grantee was
a necessary party in a will contest action, but nevertheless indicated that the trial court
had jurisdiction to try the case notwithstanding the fact that the devisee was not made a
party to the original lawsuit.
68 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 771, 23 Ohio W.L.B. 333 (C.P. 1890). Accord, Underwood
v. Hickin, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 345 (Ct. App. 1934) (trustee also executor not named as
trustee).
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been appointed by the probate court. Upon securing their appointment,
the trustees filed an action alleging that the judgment in the will con-
test was void as to them and asked the court's instructions as to the
disposition of the trust res. In denying the plea of the trustees, the
court pointed out that the legal title to the trust was vested in the
trustees by the will, and until they declined to act, they alone could
be sued as representatives of the trust.
Since the trustees of an express trust alone hold legal title to the
trust estate, it follows that the beneficiaries of the trust, although
proper parties to a will contest, are not parties necessary to the court's
jurisdiction."
Where a charitable trust is provided for in the contested will,
it would appear at first blush that the Attorney General is a necessary
party defendant.7" However, in a questioned decision,7 1 a common
pleas court reasoned that the object of a will contest is to determine
whether the paper writing in question is the last will of the testatrix,
and not to terminate a charitable trust. Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the Attorney General was not required to be joined as a
defendant.72 Nevertheless, until more persuasive authority follows the
Spang decision, caution dictates that the Attorney General be made a
defendant if charitable beneficiaries are involved in the will contest.
(d) The Executor or Administrator
In the will contest area, the problem which has precipitated the
greatest number of supreme court decisions concerns the joinder of
the executor or administrator as a defendant pursuant to Ohio Revised
Code section 2741.02.
If the fiduciary is interested in the will in more than one capacity,
e.g., as executor and as a devisee or legatee, it is mandatory and
jurisdictional that such fiduciary be made a party and summoned in his
distinctive, official capacity as executor, as well as in his individual
capacity as devisee, legatee or heir, as the case may be.73 The com-
panion cases of Peters v. Moore74 and Bynner v. Jones75 uphold this
69 Elsen v. Hughes, 87 Ohio App. 413, 94 N.E.2d 567 (1949).
70 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 109.25 (Page 1953) provides that "The attorney general is
a necessary party... in all proceedings, the object of which is to: (A) Terminate a chari-
table trust or distribute its assets to other than charitable donees...."
71 Note, 8 W. Res. L. Rev. 386 (1957).
72 Spang v. Cleveland Trust Co., 73 Ohio L. Abs. 164, 134 N.E.2d 586 (C.P. 1956).
73 Center v. St. Peter's Episcopal Church, 11 Ohio St. 2d 64, 227 N.E.2d 599 (1967);
Porter v. Fenner, 5 Ohio St. 2d 233, 215 N.E.2d 389 (1966).
74 154 Ohio St. 177, 93 N.E.2d 683 (1950).
75 154 Ohio St. 184, 93 N.E.2d 687 (1950).
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proposition. In the Peters case, the executor named in the will, who
was also a legatee thereunder, declined to serve as executor. The
successor executor named in the will was immediately appointed by
the court. The plaintiff erroneously designated the wrong person as
executor in the petition and service was had accordingly. After the
six month period had passed, the court granted a motion to dismiss the
petition for failure to join the appointed executor as a defendant. In
Bynner, the named executor was properly designated as such in the
body of the petition, but was served with process solely in his individual
capacity as devisee and legatee. Furthermore, no precipe was filed for
service upon the executor in his official capacity. It was held that the
executor was not made a party and the suit was dismissed.76
Where the executor has no relation to the estate in an individual
capacity, the trend has been toward increasing liberality. The supreme
court, in Porter v. Fenner,77 recently overruled the case of Mangan v.
Hopkins,78 which had held that where the executor is named as such
in the body of the petition, but not in the caption or the summons, the
omission is fatal. The Porter case emphasized the fact that the body
of the petition and not the caption determines who the parties are.
Because the executor was named as such in the body of the petition,
no confusion could arise as to his real capacity. Hence, the court
sanctioned the procedure of allowing amendment of the precipe and the
sheriff's return in order to show service upon the executor in his
official capacity.79
Even before the Porter decision, the harshness of Mangan v.
Hopkins,"0 had been somewhat undermined in Abbott v. Dawson,"1
in which the executor was described in his official capacity in the body
and caption of the petition, but not in the precipe. In addition, the
caption of the petition was on the summons which was duly served.
Here, the court said, the record clearly showed that the executor was
properly made a party in his official capacity.
A third possible problem area in complying with Ohio Revised
Code section 2741.02 with respect to joining the executor or adminis-
trator is the situation where no fiduciary is acting, because the
76 Accord, Bessire v. Fisher, 96 Ohio App. 465, 122 N.E.2d 491 (1953) (precipe could
not be amended after six month period to request issuance of summons upon executor
in official capacity).
77 5 Ohio St. 2d 233, 215 N.E.2d 389 (1966).
78 166 Ohio St. 41, 138 N.E.2d 872 (1956).
79 Statutory authority for amendment of the precipe and service return was based
upon Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2309.58 (Page 1953).
80 166 Ohio St. 41, 138 N.E.2d 872 (1956).
81 167 Ohio St. 238, 147 N.E.2d 609 (1958).
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executor named in the will has not applied for appointment, there is
litigation regarding the appointment of the executor, or the estate has
been closed.
In such case, it appears that the court will have no jurisdiction if
someone is not made a defendant either as administrator or executor
within six months of the probate of the will.82
In Campbell v. Johnson,83 the plaintiff was a minor who sued
within six months after reaching his majority pursuant to the "savings
clause"8 4 for persons under disability. The estate had been closed, and
the executor named in the will had been discharged many years prior to
the time the will contest was filed. The plaintiff named the discharged
executor as a defendant, but a motion to quash service upon him was
sustained. The plaintiff thereupon secured the appointment of an ad-
ministrator de bonis non and filed an amended petition, to which a
demurrer was sustained. The appellate court reasoned (1) that the
original executor, having been discharged, no longer represented the
estate; and (2) it was incumbent upon the contestant to secure the
appointment of an administrator de bonis non prior to the expiration
of the limitation period. Having failed to do so, the contestant had not
complied with the jurisdictional requirements of Ohio Revised Code
section 2741.02 and the action failed.
It is not unusual to find that no fiduciary has been appointed by
the probate court at the time the will contest is ready to be filed. This
may be due to litigation regarding the appointment of the executor
named in the will. There are no specific Ohio cases indicating who
should be made a party defendant as executor or administrator in such
a case. One possible solution is to secure the appointment of a special
administrator,8 ' who would be sued as the representative of the estate.
In conjunction with this procedure, the executor named in the will, even
though not yet appointed, should also be made a party defendant.86
If the will has no provision for the appointment of an executor, it
would seem to be incumbent upon the plaintiff to secure the appoint-
ment of an administrator against whom to proceed pursuant to the
provisions of Ohio Revised Code section 2113.06.87
82 Campbell v. Johnson, 83 Ohio App. 225, 79 N.2d 147 (1948). See Martin v.
Falconer, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 771, 23 Ohio W.L.B. 333 (C.P. 1890). But see Gurley v.
Armentraut, 6 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 156, 27 Ohio C.C.R. 199 (Cir. Ct. 1904).
83 83 Ohio App. 225, 79 N.E.2d 147 (1948).
84 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2107.23, 2741.09 (Page 1953).
85 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2113.15 (Page 1953).
8o See Martin v. Falconer, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 771, 23 Ohio W.L.B. 333 (C.P. 1890).
87 In Wrinkle v. Trabert, 174 Ohio St. 233, 188 N.E.2d 587 (1963), it was held that
where one has a claim against an estate, it is incumbent upon him, if no administrator
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V. SERVICE OF PROCESS: SAVINGS CLAUSE REGMDING
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION
A. Application of Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.17
As has been previously intimated, merely naming in the petition
all necessary persons as plaintiff or defendant in the will contest does
not confer jurisdiction upon the court. In a will contest, as in other
civil actions, a person is joined as a party defendant only when sum-
mons is issued and served upon him."8 It was thought at one time that
the commencement of will contest actions for purposes of the statute
of limitations required not only that summons be issued but that it
thereafter be served within the six month limitation period as to all
defendants. 9
It now appears clear that the curative provisions of Ohio Revised
Code section 2305.17 (Page 1953) apply to will contest actionsf0
Under this statute, an action is deemed commenced, even though all
defendants are not served within the period of limitation, provided
that the conditions of the statute are met. Ohio Revised Code section
2305.17 was amended in 1965; however, for purposes of this article
the statute will be analyzed in its present form as well as in its opera-
tion prior to amendment.
B. Unity of Interest Rule
Prior to October 30, 1965, an action was commenced within the
context of Ohio Revised Code section 2305.17 (Page 1953) "as to each
defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him or on a
codefendant . . . united in interest with him." The statute further
provided that:
within the meaning of such sections, an attempt to commence an ac-
tion is equivalent to its commencement, when the party diligently
endeavors to procure a service, if such attempt is followed by service
within sixty days.
The interpretation of this statute is still important because it ap-
plies to actions filed prior to October 30, 1965, 91 many of which are
still pending in the courts.
The unity of interest rule means in substance that for purposes of
has been appointed, to procure the appointment of an administrator against whom he
can proceed.
88 McKelvey v. McKelvey, 90 Ohio App. 563, 107 N.E.2d 555 (1951).
89 Sours v. Shuler, 42 Ohio App. 393, 187 N.E. 908 (1932).
90 See Gravier v. Gluth, 163 Ohio St. 232, 126 N.E.2d 332 (1955); Cook v. Sears,
9 Ohio App. 2d 197, 223 N.E.2d 613 (1967).
91 Cook v. Sears, 9 Ohio App. 2d 197, 223 N.E.2d 613 (1967).
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service of summons, members of the separate classes of persons desig-
nated in Ohio Revised Code section 2741.02 as necessary defendants
in a will contest are united in interest with each other, but not with
members of another class.92 Hence, under this rule, a will contest action
is properly commenced by (1) filing the petition naming all necessary
defendants within six months of probate; 93 (2) filing therewith a
precipe requesting that summons issue; 94 and (3) procuring service of
summons upon one member of each class. 5
In application of this rule, the courts have reasoned that co-
defendants are united in interest only when they are similarly affected
by the determination of issues in an action. It therefore follows that
an executor named in the will is not united in interest with the heirs and
devisees,96 and service of summons on the devisees, one of whom is
the executor, does not constitute the commencement of the action
against the executor as such.97 Similarly, the sole beneficiary under a
will who is neither an heir-at-law nor next-of-kin of the decedent is not
united in interest with decedent's heirs-at-law;98 nor is a legatee who
is not an heir or next-of-kin united in interest with co-legatees who
are next-of-kin.99 On the other hand, the legatees and devisees con-
stitute one class united in interest so that service of process upon one
of them commences the action as to all in that class.' 0
As attested by the great number of reported decisions, the unity
of interest rule caused particular difficulty in the will contest area, and
its application resulted in many litigants losing their day in court on
procedural technicalities.
C. Amended Ohio Revised Code Section 2305.17
All references to the concept of unity of interest have been deleted
from Ohio Revised Code section 2305.17, as amended (effective
92 Case v. Smith, 142 Ohio St. 95, 50 N.E.2d 142 (1943).
93 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2741.09, 2107.23 (Page 1953).
'94 Robinson v. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 174 Ohio St. 498, 190 N.E.2d 441
(1963). The rule of the Robinson case is now incorporated in Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2305.17 (Page 1953).
95 Prior to October 30, 1965, under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2305.17 (Page 1953), the
plaintiff, if diligent in his efforts, had sixty days within which to procure service. Failure to
effect service within such period of time is fatal. See Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St. 2d 212,
217 N.E.2d 213 (1966), noted in 28 Ohio St. L.J. 558 (1967).
90 McCord v. McCord, 104 Ohio St. 274, 135 N.E. 548 (1922).
97 Woodruff v. Norvill, 91 Ohio App. 251, 107 N.E.2d 911 (1951).
98 Case v. Smith, 142 Ohio St. 95, 50 N.E.2d 142 (1943).
99 Staley v. Sheck, 99 Ohio App. 242, 133 N.E.2d 189 (1954).
109 Draher v. Walters, 130 Ohio St. 92, 196 N.E. 884 (1935), overruled on other
grounds, Peters v. Moore, 154 Ohio St. 177, 93 N.E.2d 683 (1950).
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October 30, 1965). In essence an action is now commenced if service
is obtained on all defendants within one year after the filing of the
petition accompanied by the precipe or an affidavit for service by
publication, as the case may be. Presumably, under the amended
statute, the proper joinder of necessary defendants is accomplished by
service of summons on all defendants within the one year period. No
other restrictions or limitations appear on the face of the statute. It
is anticipated that the change in this statute will not only clarify the
law, but will also limit greatly the number of will contest cases which
are dismissed for want of jurisdiction for failure to effect prompt
service of summons upon one member of each class "united in interest."
VI. CONCLUSION
When a will contest is filed, a very significant step has been taken.
Family factions are embroiled in bitter litigation, often without good
cause. The attorney's duty is to discourage a contest if he does not
honestly believe that he can produce sufficient evidence to get the case
to a jury. In a landmark case concerning the validity of an in terrorem
clause, the decedent left the majority of her estate to a stranger rather
than to her nephew. The nephew alleged fraud and undue influence,
evidence of which the court found to be entirely lacking. The court,
in deciding that the in terrorem clause worked a forfeiture of the
nephew's inheritance under the will, made the following observation:
Studies which have been made show that only a very small percent-
age of will contests made on the grounds of defective execution,
mental incapacity, or undue influence are successful; and the public
interest in freeing such contests from the restraining influence of
conditions like that here involved seems of little importance com-
pared with enforcing the will of the testator that those who share in
his bounty shall not have been found guilty of besmirching his
reputation or parading the family skeletons after his death. 101
101 Barry v. American Security & Trust Co., 135 F.2d 470, 473 (1943).
